This paper relates competition studies and views on competition policy within Austrian economics to the dynamic capabilities theory. The idea of interacting research programs -tition, on the one hand, and (1) ignorance, (2) knowledge (including tacit knowledge), (3) rationality, (4) equilibrium, (5) innovation, (6) entrepreneurship, and (7) monopoly, on the other hand. Unlike the majority of previous studies, these issues are discussed here mainly through the lens of new institutional economics. Williamson's three-level scheme is used to explain opportunities and constraints for mutu ally enriching exchange of concepts between different but close approaches in economic research. This paper shows that reserved.
Introduction
Unlike neoclassical economics (NCE), Austrian economics (AE) has elaborated a set of concepts that are quite akin to recent developments in strategic manage-economics (NIE) and even transaction cost economics (TCE). This is true de--come barriers to interaction of research traditions both at the level of systemic approach (e.g., NCE, AE, NIE, TCE) and with regard to particular issues concerning economic analysis. What are the sources of the misunderstanding? Is it possible to mitigate at least a part of the problem? That is what we would like to discuss. sustained as between AE and NIE. Some concepts are used in both theories (e.g., as the functions of an entrepreneur. Among the rare exceptions it is worth mentioning several works by Kirsten and Nikolai Foss devoted to these issues (Foss and Foss, 1998 , 2001 , 2002 , 2006 . This fact would not be so important if it were not the environment, namely to competition, restrictions of competition and competition policy. At the same time, these processes, as innumerous studies show, are crucially important for both economic growth and economic development.
of ideas between theories in order to better understand practical aspects of interactions between economic agents. This issue plays an important role in determining optimal competition policy design, in particular, and the potential engines of economic development, in general. From this perspective, the paper addresses theory... the microanalytic, comparative institutional, economizing orientation of transaction cost economics deals with many of the key issues with which business strategy is or should be concerned... The economizing approach to - (Williamson, 1996, p. 321) At the same time, as it will be demonstrated, AE concepts (especially related to competition issues) are very close in spirit to the analysis of dynamic capabilities and the search for sustainable competition advantages (SCA) of This paper continues the line of work by Foss and Foss in interpreting the concept of competition within the AE, the interrelation between competition and ignorance, knowledge (above all, tacit ), equilibrium, entrepreneurship, innovations and monopoly. Special attention will be devoted to the understanding of antitrust policy in Austrian economics in the context of antitrust law evolution and the accumulation of experience in applying its provisions. general framework of this study.
Point of view AE and other research traditions,
1 neither do we perform a detailed analysis of internal discussions within AE on the issues mentioned above. In this paper, AE will be examined from the point of view of opponents rather than proponents.
on the research tradition originating from Williamson's works (which might be recent studies will be covered 2 -3 2. Why was NIE rather than NCE chosen as a benchmark? There are at least three reasons. First, the opposition to NCE in AE has been pivotal to the positionthis reason, AE has been compared to NCE many times and from a wide range the gaps and corrects some failures of the approach adopted within NCE. Third, 3. Framework. The survey of AE concepts related to competition issues 4 is organized within the context of -level scheme: the third section covers different aspects of individual choice the fourth section, we discuss economic exchange through different institutional arrangements section is devoted to the institutional environment -responding to different options (mechanisms) of actors' adaptation to changing circumstances. The sixth section presents a discussion of competition and competition policy problems within the context of the theory of industrial organiza-- shown, AE complements the framework for dynamic capabilities drawn by other -for mutual enrichment of the theories evidently remain underexploited. The Austrian concept of competition and its application in economic policy relies both on notions commonly accepted in economic theory, such as market, -understanding of the concepts that are broadly used within the framework of the parties to a transaction have no incentives to reconsider the choice made, whereas for representatives of the Austrian tradition, the main characteristic of equilibrium is taking full account of alternatives of using the available resources.
Issues of competition study in AE:
---Within the context of AE, competition (competitive order) is a process of discovery of new opportunities to use known resources, which results from the en---Proponents of AE see their main advantage over NCE in treating competition as a process rather than a condition or a result, both of which are static. The ap---petition as market characteristics (in terms of the number of sellers, entry and exit barriers, product differentiation, distribution of information, market concentration indicators), and results of competition as equilibrium prices and quantities sold. At the same time, as the neoclassical approach does not qualify modeled individual choice as a process, the distinction between conditions and results in research, based on the assumption of full rationality, is also relative. This is why AE quite reasonably considers competition in its neoclassical interpretation through equilibrium exclusively as a certain state of affairs (Amendola et al., 2003) .
implicitly contains some aspects determining the program of further presentation: the way this process is connected to knowledge and ignorance, rationality of choice and tacit knowledge, equilibrium (lack of equilibrium) and monopoly,
Competition in the context of individual choice

Competition, ignorance, and knowledge
in the process of receiving information and its subsequent use enables actors scarce resources, both of which constitute important characteristics of the market entities' private plans and actions can be coordinated, and the better results of economic performance and development can be achieved.
The statement complies with the provision concerning the ignorance of actors and partially the thesis of bounded rationality within the context of NIE. The downside of the problem of using knowledge in society is the high methodological status of the concept of ignorance within the AE.
Ignorance means a decision-maker lacks knowledge of circumstances and opportunities that matter from the point of view of attaining his goals, even if that person tries to make rational (reasonable) decisions. A process of movement from ignorance to knowledge about new opportunities that enable the creation of new value is an important element of competition.
--Changing the borderline between knowledge and ignorance for actors is an esa borderline within the context of individual behavior is a characteristic of AE, but without an accent on collective actions based on mechanisms of coordination -rowed from TCE.
The distinction between knowledge and lack of knowledge is also present in the economics of information based on maintaining the optimization logic of inused to receive knowledge have an opportunity cost (Stigler, 1961) . The process of obtaining information is similar to other types of production processes and never involves unexpectedness (surprises).
Thus, discovery as the conceptual core of the competitive process for AE is something between the results of systematic search, when an economic entity obtains the ex ante a display of features characteristic for an entrepreneur (Kirzner, 1997, p. 72) . The obtaining and use of information on new opportunities through organizational performance is a process that has a similar nature to the one described by Kirzner with one important detail: this information is a result of coordinated efforts of individuals within a mechanism of governance alternative to the market (in this case -hierarchy), which also might be interpreted in terms of dynamic capabilities or meta-routines -capabilities that allow performance to be changed either in response to changed circumstances or to the exploitation of new ideas. According to Winter (Winter, 2003) , dynamic capabilities are the second (higher) order capabilities that prefeature of dynamic capabilities is the combination of frequent organizational ac-A similar problem arises in connection with modeling based on the assumption of information asymmetry, which is crucial for the principal-agent literature. The principal may be unaware of the characteristics of a particular agent that are important for the former, but at the same time, according to basic agency models, there is information concerning the characteristics of the distribution of different types of agents on a certain market. A proponent of AE would agree that the principal is unaware of the intrinsic characteristics of a particular agent and the principal does not have knowledge about the distribution of agents between their different types either, or even about the very set of possible types of agents (at least ex ante). This is especially important for the case of multiple valuable characteristics of agents and of goods and services to be provided by them that remain hidden from the principal.
With respect to product markets, ignorance actually means the existence of op--pants in economic exchanges. 6 A lack of ignorance is equivalent to a lack of opportunities not only for discovery but also for ranking alternatives by a decision-maker. This is why in a situation of full awareness by participants in economic exchanges, competition as a process becomes impossible. Moreover, it is the same reason why the subject matter (i.e., dynamic capabilities as sources of SCA) evaporates.
The concept of ignorance of the present but hidden (unperceivable but detectable as a result of the entrepreneur's actions, or exploitation of dynamic capabiliex ante result) opportunities is supplemented in the Austrian tradition with ignorance in time. It is a lack of knowledge about the consequences of the actions of the decision-maker within the context of simultaneous activities of many other people atomistically adapting to changing circumstances. From this perspective, ignorance is closely connected with unpredictable and unexpected results of competition.
It is important to emphasize that unpredictability of the future may be quite an agent compares the costs of search and acquisition of information, on the one -criticized (including behavioral economics research by Kahnemann, Tversky, -certainty according to Knight (1921) , rather than hazard with a known objective probability of the onset of different versions of future events. In reality, however, neoclassical sense of the word, but even in terms of parametric uncertainty, which Knight presented as the true uncertainty whereby the set of elementary events is ex ante and it is therefore impossible to estimate the value of investments in obtaining reliable information. This is a characteristic of structural uncertainty within the frames of which a decision-maker can see and, hence, specify only ex ante changes SCA in a permanently changing environment with various types of shocks. An actor may acknowledge that events he/she is unaware of may take place in -ties to attain his/her goals. This is why the characteristics of individual behavadjustment (by incorporating recent experience in initial plans).
To draw a line: according to AE, competition is a process of moving the borderthe very moment of acquiring knowledge, can be evaluated ex ante and hence cannot be an object of rational choice (in the sense this concept is interpreted by NCE).
The ex post study of behavior and exchange results only creates the veil of certo the normative area. Regarding antitrust policy, it is related to risks of type I errors: accusation and prosecution of an innocent actor by imputing to him an awareness of processes that ex ante were (ineradicably) unexpected. Regarding strategic management issues it might provide false ground for an ad hoc reaction to a particular event without a broader context of the issue: development of ready to be substituted for perfect forecasts (as it is implicitly supposed).
Competition and rationality
Rationality is a fundamental concept in economics. It establishes correspondence between an actor's goals and the means of their attainment (Robbins, 1935, p. 16 ).
--
The traditional concept of rationality of choice within the frames of NCE is based on the optimization technique applied in economics where subjective criteria of rational choice are not essential. From this viewpoint, rationality is instrumental. Competition might be considered as a set of conditions and as a result in conjunction with instrumental rationality. Thus, instrumentality of rationality makes redundant the attempts to disclose the nature of competition as a process, if it does not rule them out completely.
According to AE, human rationality cannot be regarded in terms of optimization because inseparable elements of the optimization task are formed in the process of the market's functioning. To understand the nature of competition within importance is the decision-maker's ignorance of various circumstances that matter for the purpose of attaining his goals. Moreover, a person's ignorance can also be the result of a rational (but not necessarily maximizing) choice. Meanwhile, the relationship between competition and rationality in AE is far from being as trivial as it seems in the context of competition models constituting the elements of the theory of price. In fact, if competition is weak, participants' decisions aresion-making is not free of charge and errors, on the one hand, and that it requires time and rather serious emotional tension, on the other hand. Thus, a lack of competition correlates with the slack in behavior in search of opportunities to create value/ minimize cost as a way to provide SCA. At the same time, the limited opportunities for imitation are actually a condition for rent appropriation (ex post), on the one hand, and are incentives to develop capabilities (ex ante) (Kay, 2010 (Kay, , p. 1210 , on the other.
At the same time, the intensity of competition may limit the opportunities for reasoning due to an increase in opportunity cost of each section of time as a frame 2009, p. 511). This in turn leads to a substitution of rational decision-making by intuitive decision-making. Using the comparative analysis of cognitive systems suggested by Kahneman (2003) , the latter, in addition to offering concepmany cases may require less effort. This is a possible direct effect of competition.
of opportunities for reasoning on the basis of development and application of special techniques and algorithms of decision-making. In some sense, the extension of the sphere of rational decisions by adding intuitive decisions conforms to -within a particular framework without excluding intuition.
At the same time, from the point of view of the result, decisions might actu--time, but because of lack of incentives for identifying and comparing resource-available alternatives. A considerable share of such situations is associated with external competitive constraints for market players. Competition involves more rational although there is no clear mutual consistency between the strength of competition and reasoning behind the market players' actions. This conclusion is closer to AE, which follows the logic of organic rationality, or rationality of the process (Williamson, 1985) , which is actively explored by evolutionary theory. Thus, mechanisms balancing individual intuition, on the one hand, and individual and collective reasoning, on the other, look like engines for revealing new opportunities as a source of SCA.
The concept of awareness and rationality plays an important role in antitrust policy. The conceptual basis of antitrust policy presumes that the market players restricting competition can anticipate the effect of their actions. Moreover, other market players are assumed to be capable of identifying the actions of competitors and counterparties and their impact on the terms of their own decisions. Therefore, other market participants can evaluate the extent of the impact of counterparties' and competitors' actions on the competitive environment. Evidently, this concept is completely unacceptable for AE. It may also seem ambiguous from the point players' opportunities for rational decision-making hopelessly lost.
In this connection, the assessment of competition advocacy is relevant as -vocacy is to promote ideas and values of competition in society and convincing competition by legal rules.
The reason for advocacy in the framework of NCE is unclear. Assuming that economic entities are capable of evaluating their potential gains from alternative versions of the market structure, expenses of competition advocacy seem to be an embezzlement of resources. Regarding NIE, competition advocacy seems quite reasonable, since informing market participants reduces enforcement costs. The idea of competition advocacy might seem to be close to AE, given that the padoes not support competition advocacy, albeit for different reasons than their colleagues' abiding principles of NCE. From the perspective of AE, arguments -tion, cannot be an element of informing market participants.
The skepticism of Austrians concerns not only antitrust policy but also competition policy in general. In contrast to NCE models that proceed from the assumption that all market participants are aware of the possible gains and losses in any state of the world, AE argues that no one can know about these gains and losses, including the corresponding state agency. In this context, judgment regarding a preferential market status is not possible, nor are evaluative judgments concerning the market structure and the actions of its participants. It is very imporfrom competition within the AE research tradition (Mund, 1933) . This idea was versa) was revised.
Competition, innovation and entrepreneurship
bivalent and ambiguous. It arouses the greatest level of discord among representatives of different traditions in economic research. This becomes particularly clear when comparing the concept of an entrepreneur with actors such as consumers and owners of resources. It is not accidental that standard economics textbooks seldom contain systematic presentations of the theory of entrepreneurship. This is even the case for AE, where Kirznerian concept of the entrepreneur is criticized by his colleagues for the erroneous separation of entrepreneur and -preneurship, which argues that an entrepreneur is always a capital owner but not delving into a review of entrepreneurship theories and their variations within the concept of entrepreneurship in the context of competition studies in AE that First, although Kirzner argues that the entrepreneurial function is not logically connected with property rights to assets, de-facto one-sided complemen tarity also of the readiness to bear the burden of risks of losses in case of failure. This important in order for the decision-maker to make what are likely to be painful decisions.
Second, the entrepreneur's function might be explained in terms of arbitrage (spatial and inter-temporal) due to discovery of new opportunities for coordinating the individual plans of market players. Within this context the concept of an entrepreneur is close to the concept of arbitrage, which is easily compatible with NCE. In fact, there are usually sellers on the market who sell products that are underpriced or overpriced, and buyers who are ready to pay higher or lower prices that the same product can be purchased at a lower price, and the sellers offering the product at a lower price may be unaware that someone was ready to purchase may be too expensive, but not for all market players.
The entrepreneurial function consists in identifying such buyers and sell--terests of each of the actors, which constitutes a necessary condition for voluneconomically important information by the entrepreneur to other market players concerning the existing opportunities to use the assets at their disposal and, correspondingly their value.
ial function disappears, as does the possibility of generating entrepreneurial profit. In this sense, there is an insurmountable contradiction between the neoclassical model of general equilibrium and the concept of entrepreneurship in AE.
tional entrepreneurial activity, including organizational innovations. At the same time, as it might be supposed, dynamic capabilities providing SCA are not invariant to the particular institutional environment including the mode of enforcement -case, however, these changes are costly and time consuming. Moreover, there are some grounds to doubt the substitutability of the two types of capabilities. This means that entrepreneurial activity aimed at SCA is also differentiated where two types of dynamic capabilities are concerned. Third, entrepreneurs are people who can quite easily be analytically singled empirically (Salerno, 2008) . This is connected with the fact that being a member of a group of managers, workers, landowners, consumers and owners of capital does not make a person an entrepreneur. For this, he/she should display his/her -derpriced assets. In the extent to which actors cope with this task, they might be -Fourth, people have different attitudes, including the ability to notice this sustaining net losses as a consequence of an error resulting from excess decisivefocus (or perceptiveness, according to Kirzner). The origin of this differentiation of focus as a person's ability to notice opportunities is a separate issue. It is impor--tion of entrepreneurs among the entire multitude of economic agents.
Entrepreneurs have an advantage in identifying hidden opportunities and therefore shift the system of economic exchange toward equilibrium in the sense that, ceteris paribus, the system of prices provides a more complete account of the set of resources and the multitude of alternative options for their use if external shocks do not move the system away from equilibrium proxy. In this sense, the very generation of hidden opportunities remains beyond the realms of focus of AE to the extent that the processes of changing preferences, available production technologies, as well as set and quantity of available resources are not being taken into -preneurship but also for policy issues is the inappropriateness of the representative resources, namely, valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable (Katkalo et al., 2010 (Katkalo et al., , p. 1175 , because it presupposes the uniqueness of resources.
hidden opportunities can be closely connected with the creation of new opportunities, which are largely described in terms of Schumpeter's (1912 Schumpeter's ( /1934 ) theory of economic development, but are quite suitable for purposes use may at the same time lead to restrictions of competition from the point of view of the antitrust authorities and the court, even though they are nothing other than manifestations of entrepreneurship and, hence, competition. In this connection, an exhaustive (closed) list of prohibited forms of economic organization (contracting) enables type I errors to be minimized, thereby outlawing such actions and agreements of a market player that do not restrict competition in reality might be regarded as an institutional arrangement in the form of a vertical restandard commercial practices or the tradition of NIE, which identify both negative and positive effects of this sort of restrictions, AE has not developed its own towards antitrust policy as a set of instruments for improving the market's perfor---ties related to the practices mentioned above?
For AE, the discharge of the entrepreneurial function is the driving force of
In principle, it does not raise the issue of a possible negative impact of entrepreneurship on welfare. For NCE, on the contrary, such a view of the issue has long been traditional, especially when the point is entrepreneurship under condi--policy design with respect to competition.
Competition in the context of interaction between market players
Competition and market equilibrium
Following the logic of AE, competition is a process that exists only in a disequilibrium economic system in the sense that not all options for using resources plans. This is the case irrespective of some disputes within AE on the methodological status of the equilibrium concept (see, for example, discussions of -mance generates disequilibration).
Economic agents' plans and expectations are only partially compatible, which becomes clear at the moment they start interacting with each other. This is why long-term equilibrium on the market of perfect competition was regarded by Austrian economists as a contradictio in adjecto. Nash equilibrium as one of the main tools of competitive analysis in contemporary microeconomics seems to from the selected strategy, given a particular strategy of another party, to another strategy or party of strategic interaction, economic development would stop.
The methodological status of market equilibrium in AE has an important characteristic. Equilibrium is not a starting point in explaining the functioning like' AE of Kirzner. The result achievable with different levels of probability and proximity reduces the ignorance of market players (zero ignorance is an equilibrium correlative) (Kirzner, 1997, p. 62). The parameters regarded by NCE as an essential element of equilibrium turn out not to be even a result in AE, but rather a direction of changes on the market explained by the actions of the market actors. According to AE, a market process takes place only when the results differ from expectations. This compels market actors to adjust expectations and decisions in the next period and change the mode of actions. This sort of adjustment is made in the form of revision of the opportunities set open (visible and attainable) to decision-makers. As a result of such revisions, some opportunities turn out to be phantoms and others overlooked.
The very discovery of this sort of opportunity is closely connected with the interests of actors, since it is their individually assessed opportunities, rather than the opportunities of society as a whole. In addition, the revision of opportunities --sible in the case of offering more attractive conditions to partners in the market process and outdistancing one's competitors.
If equilibrium is achieved, plans and expectations are compatible, the market players are not being offered more attractive alternatives which were unnoticed before. It means that competition has stopped being an active force. It corretemporal equilibrium is derived by collapsing the future into the present, there can be no need for any further decisions.
Equilibrium accounts for the side effects and unforeseen results of interactions of entities acting in their own interests. It is impossible to plan this result due to the ignorance of the decision makers for whom the discovery of new opportunities is a surprise in the sense that none of the participants can specify the paramex ante. Explaining the obtained results ex post is the most that can be achieved. This feature of equilibrium is a basis for far-reaching conclusions regarding economic policy in the sphere of competition protection with important backward implicathat AE is close to NIE regarding this matter. The fewer elements of so-called hybrid models that NIE models contain (i.e., assumptions of full and bounded rationality, zero and positive transaction costs in different dimensions of economic exchanges are combined), the farther away they are from the orthodox methods of NCE and the less these structures rely on the concept of equilibrium and the more they rely on descriptions of characteristics of coordination mechanisms. It is not accidental that comparative analysis of governance mechanisms is the core of the methodology in the TCE. The key problem here is combining the incentives design with the development of mechanisms of economic agents' adaptation to changing circumstances (Williamson, 1985 (Williamson, , 1996 .
tion (transformation and transaction) costs change connected with the restructuring of production capacities demonstrates the difference of competition as a state of affairs determined in terms of equilibrium and competition as disequilibrium. Within such a formulation of the problem, the number of market the XX century. the problems of the market structure. Paradoxical as it may seem, in this matter, -acteristics as a result of a certain market structure. This particular program was the main object of AE criticism.
The modern theory of industrial organization has long stopped supporting the postulate of unilateral dependence: the market structure determines conduct and thus the characteristics of results (prices, quantity, welfare effects). Models where the market structure is being formed under the impact of decisions of its participants, including strategic interaction as it is presented within gametheoretic framework, had become much more widespread several decades ago. This particular approach is closest to the Austrian concept of competition as -of the market players, e.g., production costs related to the employed technologies and forms of economic organization used. Turning to competition policy issues from the perspectives of equilibrium and SCA the following should be stressed: actions, namely antitrust enforcement, aimed at the establishment and control of economic activity parameters that are largely a result of entrepreneurial activity have a negative impact on entrepreneurship, weakening and distorting incentives. Some of these consequences are (1) the mutation of SCA, (2) the weakening value creation activity and (3) the strengthening SCA in redistribution or rent-seeking.
Therefore, competition in AE is possible only in a situation of market disequilibrium. Fixing an equilibrium is equivalent to the absence of competition. This is what hinders dialogue between AE and researchers using competition models that constitute the conceptual basis of competition policy. In these models, Nash equilibrium and similar instruments are crucial for positive analysis and normative conclusions.
Competition and monopoly
The interplay of competition with other important analytical elements of AE provides a key to understanding the radical contradiction between AE and NCE on the issue of monopoly.
From the Austrian position, a market process exists as long as there is freedom process means competition. In this context a monopoly examined in economics as a special market structure is a myth because even a monopolist in the neoclassical sense of the word encounters the need to reveal hidden opportunities that are not reThis does not mean that monopoly does not deserve Austrians' attention. Monopoly is the opposite of competition, which is what underlies the approach to school. Competition is a process in which economic agents (entrepreneurs) offer more appealing alternatives to their counteragents, whereas the restriction of this sort of opportunity is none other than monopoly. This is why the main source of man-made monopoly is the government, which restricts the choice of alternatives by means of regulation (Armentano 1999, p. 96) .
product market does not mean the impossibility of legitimizing private monopoly in principle. The distinction between the monopoly of a manufacturer as a product (service) producer and the monopoly of a manufacturer as a resource owner is of principal importance to AE. This distinction is largely manifested in normative evaluations of two types of analytical elements. The element of resource monopoly is legitimate whereas the product monopoly (naturally, on an unregulated market ) is a myth. For example, this myth is close to Rothbard's skepticism the individual members of the cartel, then they will act formally to merge into -dependent action almost always destroys the cartel. The cartel form, therefore, (Rothbard, 2009, p. 651) Remarkably, these ideas correspond to the so-called hostile tradition in antitrust described by Williamson (1985) .
Exclusive control over a resource without which production of a certain set --forts aimed at identifying and creating new opportunities and combinations of resources to make the outcomes more appealing for counterparties seeking for dynamic capabilities to provide SCA within the context of value creation.
olistic activity in regulated sectors. From the perspective of AE, the very concept of an economic basis for identifying a natural monopolistic activity is erroneous --ing in exchange for a guarantee of entry restriction and compensation for losses, introduce competition to natural monopolistic markets requiring a radical reform of the regulation regime are seen by representatives of AE strictly negatively as addressing problems by inappropriate methods.
tween competition and monopoly consists in the fact that AE sees the source of monopoly in circumstances which are external with respect to market perforgovernment interventions, exclusive and monopolistic rights to natural resources essential for the production of relevant goods and services. Free market is considered competitive by nature. From this point of view, the concept of private monopoly as a source of loss of public welfare is groundless, as is the theory of market failures.
in contrast with the state-induced one. The key element of proof is presented by Rothbard: --rectly by consumers or indirectly from them through lower-order producers) is inelastic, so that a decreased production of the good and a higher price will lead to increased expenditure on his product and therefore increased income demands of the consumers. If the consumers were really angry at this 'monopolistic action', they could easily make their demand curves elastic by boycotting the producer and/or by increasing their demands at the 'competitive' the existing state of affairs and demonstrates that they, as well as the producer, (Rothbard, 2009, p. 634) There are at least three ways to criticize this point of view from the perspectives of different approaches.
First, NCE: the monopoly price appears on the elastic segment of market demand in terms of the standard of elasticity estimates adopted.
Second, NIE: obvious problems of collective action and the free-rider problem are omitted, assuming that consumers are aware of the consequences of practices implemented by the producer.
Third, behavioral economics: it is not always clear whether the producer exthe expense of consumers.
Antitrust policy
Normative applications of the concepts developed within AE, including the concept of competition, are one of the most important and at the same time most sensitive issues closely related to practical problems in searching for economics on virtually all key problems of economic policy, especially com--ciency of antitrust policy in terms of fostering competition as a vehicle of economic development. This is partially connected with the contradiction between the fundamental concepts of the two schools and partially with a simple lack of mutual understanding. Proponents of AE believed that all designs in the development of antitrust policy measures proceed from the model of perfect competition 7 while there were at least two waves of antirust reshaping in the 1970s and 1990s. In reality, the overwhelming majority of economists who do not agree with AE postulates would join the idea that the theory of perfect competition as antitrust policy. According to AE, antitrust policy as a system of rules (exclusions of contract freedom principle) and enforcement mechanisms is based on the erroneous interpretation of the nature of competition or on government actions distorting the competitive environment. Such evaluation of antitrust policy foundations by AE does not leave much room to discuss the differences in interpretation of directions or spheres of application of antitrust policy methods.
All of these are regarded by AE as harmful for competition. For example , a selective antitrust ban on mergers is interpreted as a restriction of entrepreirrespec tive p. 643-644).
The ban (or even structural and behavioral remedies) on cartel agreements --tively penalized for price collusion in an amount exceeding 800 million euros. 8 AE regards this decision as one of many failures of antitrust regulation, because it impossible to estimate the level of prices that could have been formed on the target market of vitamins without collusion. Intervention by antitrust authorities is interpreted as a violation of the principle of freedom of contract. The enforced leniency program seems to be nothing but a tool of unfair competition and a way in the ideas of AE, for example with respect to vertical restraints, tacit colluThe notion of market failures is the conceptual core of the discussion about the foundations and instruments of antitrust policy in the context of the interacting and competing research traditions. 9 The idea of market failures 10 contradicts the AE approach, whereas in NCE they have been regarded as grounds for govern ment interventions in economic exchanges since the works of Arthur Pigou, while for NIE government intervention is one of possible remedies for market failures but not necessary a better one. In this sense, a compromise between AE, NIE and NCE concerning the antitrust policy possibilities and framework seems quite unlikely.
Evidently, not only the practice but also the principles of antitrust policy may problems is a (theoretically rather trivial) conceptual separation of the protection --searchers and politicians. Its implementation implies that antitrust policy should not be used as a tool by groups of special interests in pursuing their goals (as an be implemented in practice? In addition to any other policy envisioning the setting of rules and enforcement mechanisms, the antitrust policy has certain distributive implications that might be interpreted (at least ex post) as protection of particular groups of market players (including competitors).
According to the logic of the Austrian approach, special protection of competition by the government leads to competition restriction, i.e., the opposite result. This argument is used to draw a general conceptual conclusion that antitrust policy is not needed for rectifying the market operation.
Unlike the problem of antitrust legislation as a whole, the comparison of different schools' conceptions of particular antitrust policy tools has a certain perspective. A comparison of AE and NIE research traditions (with respect to TCE) shows contrasting attitudes to the rule of reason vs. per se rule in antitrust.
mance of activities or agreements to those prohibited by law. If such conformance is established, they are recognized as guilty of violating antitrust law. The rule of reason, on the contrary, allows the restriction of competition if such practice regains from the use of various forms of restricting agreements. Applying the rule the adopted commercial practice.
The problem of ignorance is expressly raised both in the frames of AE and -cess for principled reasons of its unpredictability. In contrast, the approach based on Williamson's work does not rule out identifying an ideal outcome, although it questions the possibility and necessity of taking this outcome into account evaluating organizational performance.
SCA might depend on economic concepts that in fact stand behind some economic policy instruments' design and their implementation. Regarding antitrust policy, and parcel of the business model it refers to the requirements of the regulatory -pabilities might be not only value creating but also value (re)distributing. This is why managing antitrust risks does not necessarily mean value-creating activity using antitrust agency as a tool. These worries come directly from AE.
AE and policy implications of the theory of industrial organization:
Questions for DCT
The practice of antitrust law enforcement, starting at least from the second half of the 20 th century, relies more or less on the concepts developed by economic theory. It has been mentioned by Richard Posner: powerful explanatory variable is simply the state of economic opinion. Antitrust doctrine has changed more or less in tandem with changes in eco- (Posner, 2001, p. 286) This is particularly visible in the United States, where the dominance of -the turn of the 21 st century, the Chicago tradition was gradually displaced by Post-Chicago concepts based on considerably wider involvement of NIE concepts. The concepts of the market, competition, and the role of antitrust policy, 11 the contemporary competition theory inherited primarily from Joan Robinson and major market participants were recognized as admittedly being motivated to re--duct of market players conforms to the dominance of the per se rule in antitrust enforcement. These ideas have been refuted based on a set of empirical tests.
approach from the foreground of industry studies. th century), in the early 20 th century suggest the prevalence of this approach (Armentano, 1999) . Arguments favoring the actions of companies with a high market share were simply disregarded by the courts (Piriano, 2007) , probably due to populist responses to the fear of large companies. In the 1930s, some researchers sought to prove the idea of much more complex relations between market concentration the Chicago school. Many concepts of the Chicago school relied on two common -11 in the 20th and early 21 st centuries.
as tools to restrict competition (above all, vertical restraints) in reality may have no such implications. It is up to special analysis in each particular case to establish any negative consequences (rule of reason instead of per se rule). Within the framework of this particular period application of the rule of reason was obviously rapidly increasing. The use of the Chicago school as a conceptual basis for antitrust law enforceantitrust law enforcement became more substantiated from the economic point of -er due to possible lowering of the predictability of its enforcement under weak standards of economic analysis. This means that SCA probably does not include multi-level complex capabilities that provide strong compliance with antitrust was no clear content of antitrust bans and standards to prove guilt or innocence and, consequently, no clear boundary between zero sanctions and multimillionand business-to-government relations to mitigate the antitrust risks mentioned.
At the same time, it is quite indicative that despite a considerably lower level of assumed antitrust intervention, the Chicago school approach was also heavily to protect market institutions. From the perspective of the Austrian school, those -tion of the market players' practice in concrete cases.
From the Austrians' point of view, even though the Chicago approach uses an ex--vidual choice, and consequently, of interactions. The most vivid example is the optimism of the Chicago school with respect to contestable markets, where the absence even if there are no opportunities at each given moment for loss-free functioning of The Post-Chicago approach seems to be even less acceptable for AE. This approach based on a new methodology in a certain sense restores the conclusions -en the producer's monopolistic power on a related market. The antitrust cases used the approach of unlawfulness of agreements restricting competition per se. The authors of the Chicago school have demonstrated that exclusive contracts cannot restrict market entry and therefore market competition. A number of later (Post-Chicago) models show that the restriction of competition by vertical restrictive contracts is not an inevitable consequence but is nevertheless quite possible under certain circumstances.
From the perspective of the Post-Chicago approach, there are many agreements and actions, the effect of which does not allow their lawfulness or unlawfulness to be presumed. An in-depth analysis of the conditions and expected consequences of the use of agreements is needed. From the perspective of the Austrian school, that approach is based on excessively optimistic attitude to obtaining and qualiresearch programs. The reason is almost self-evident: the evaluation of opportunities to explain and predict depends crucially on the assumptions and tools implemented. This is the real challenge to overcome.
Conclusion
The answer to the question in the paper's headline is in fact the answer of -ties, which in turn are necessary conditions for success in competition as a pro--nities for business is in fact another aspect of the discovery of new resources -sources. At the same time, the closeness of the fundamentals of the two theories -in conceptual frameworks.
Evolved and exploited dynamic capabilities are another side of competition in -ences in the operational and conceptual interpretation of competition. At the same time, these methods are not invariant to content and ways to develop relevant dynamic capabilities.
According to AE, relevant information is generated and transferred precisely within the framework of competition as a process and is not available ex ante for agents, even for very experienced ones. In practice, this means that it is impossible to functionally use something that turns out to be an unforeseen and unintended result of interaction for the purposes of explaining an economic agent's conduct. This is why it is inexpedient to consider competition on the basis of models where To understand the content of competition from the perspective of AE, it is important to see the demarcation line between ignorance and knowledge, how it changes and how (or whether) differences in peoples' alertness ensure the movement of the economic system toward equilibrium. Unexpectedness, unpredictability of particular competition results, both for politicians and for market actors themselves, are necessary conditions for skepticism of the very possibility -In the world of structural uncertainty, dynamic capabilities might demonstrate advantages over capabilities that are in fact pseudo-dynamic.
tect competition by the state, on the one hand, and skepticism regarding opportunities to explain in advance and in detail the particular content of SCA in the system fully relevant for antitrust regulation as well. NIE, in turn, sees fewer grounds for government intervention under the pretext of restrictions of competition by market -tion, but does not fully deny antitrust policy opportunities. This is the fundamental difference between AE and NIE regarding the possibilities of competition policy.
The comparison of AE with NCE and NIE shows the difference in the views on the limits of the permissible in the activity of the government. For some type is block exemptions as a particular form of the rule of reason. For other cases this presumption becomes imperative. It is for the reason of much greater proximity between AE and NIE as opposed to NCE that we might expect dramatic discussions of the details of both competition and antitrust policy between the NIE and AE strands of economic thinking.
Antitrust policy is not an exception among other manifestations of government activity criticized by AE. Is this position regarding competition and antitrust policy a matter of faith or knowledge based on experience? The answer is as simple establishing truth in rivalry of different research programs. In all likelihood, from the positive theory perspective, these approaches do not compete at all, because -tions in the regulatory sphere, especially in the normative context, are not only unavoidable but mostly evident.
Further discussion of the differences in the understanding of dynamic capabilities, competition, competition policy frameworks and possibilities of different research programs envisions the solution of an important methodological problem. In fact, this problem was highlighted at the very beginning of the article: a simplidiscussion not with real intellectual opponents, but with phantoms on all sides of the discussion -ways to transform the dialogue between the blind and the deaf to a dialogue between those who possess the power of speech and sight.
